The official US line on the Iranian WMD threat and sanctions
by
Dave Kimble at
www.peakoil.org.au
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This is an excerpt of a report given to the Senate Armed Services Committee by the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, on 16 Feb 2012 and is the clearest indication that the US knows Iran does NOT have a nuclear weapons program:
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| http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20120216_SASC%20Final%20Unclassified%20-%202012%20ATA%20SFR.pdf
Unclassified Statement for the Record on
the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community
for the Senate Committee on Armed Services
James R. Clapper
Director of National Intelligence
February 16, 2012
[Pages 5-6]
WMD Threats: Iran and North Korea
We assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.
Iran nevertheless is expanding its uranium enrichment capabilities, which can be used for either civil or weapons purposes. As reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency, to date, Iran in late October 2011 had about 4,150 kg of 3.5 percent enriched UF6 and about 80 kg of 20-percent enriched UF6 produced at Natanz. Iran confirmed on 9 January that it has started enriching uranium for the first time at its second enrichment plant, near Qom.
Iran’s technical advancement, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthens our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, making the central issue its political will to do so. These advancements contribute to our judgment that Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon, if it so chooses.
We judge Iran would likely choose missile delivery as its preferred method of delivering a nuclear weapon. Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and it is expanding the scale, reach, and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces, many of which are inherently capable of carrying a nuclear payload.
We judge Iran’s nuclear decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran. Iranian leaders undoubtedly consider Iran’s security, prestige, and influence, as well as the international political and security environment, when making decisions about its nuclear program.
Iran’s growing inventory of ballistic missiles and its acquisition and indigenous production of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) provide capabilities to enhance its power projection. Tehran views its conventionally armed missiles as an integral part of its strategy to deter — and if necessary retaliate against — forces in the region, including US forces. Its ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering WMD, and, if so armed, would fit into this strategy.
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As you can see, they "do not know if Iran will
eventually decide to build nuclear weapons". This implies that Iran is not doing so now. In spoken testimony to the Committee, Clapper was asked the questions
| Sen. LINDSEY GRAHAM (R-SC): You have doubt about the Iranian’s intention when it comes to making a nuclear weapon?
JAMES CLAPPER: I do.
GRAHAM: So you’re not sure they’re trying to make a bomb? [...]
CLAPPER: I think they’re keeping themselves in a position to make that decision but there are certain things they have not yet done and have not done for some time. [...]
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So what is the difference between 'peacefully and legally enriching Uranium for nuclear reactors', and 'keeping one's self in a position to make the decision to make a bomb' ?
None that I can see.
Japan, for example, is in the same position (only more so, since it also reprocesses Plutonium), and yet the US doesn't think it necessary to impose sanctions on them.
Of course the Japanese have renounced nuclear weapons as evil, but then so has Iran.
The difference, of course, is that
the US doesn't like Iran, and wants to bring about regime change. A more compliant Iran would de-nationalise their oil industry and open their economy to the west, giving huge opportunities for US oil companies and others to make more profits.
The US thinks it could work with Mir-Hossein Mousavi, for example, who was the leader of the unsuccessful "green revolution" after he lost the last Presidential election. He was Prime Minister in 1981 when the Iran-Contra affair was hatched, so he has proved he can work with the US.
Mousavi was also the one who negotiated with Pakistan's AQ Khan over the acquisition of enrichment technology, but I'm sure the US could overlook that - in fact it seems to have disappeared from the pages of history already. The US also seems to have forotten its commitment to human rights, as Mousavi also oversaw the execution of over 3,000 (some say 6,000) political prisoners in 1989.
Of course long forgotten is the uncomfortable fact that the US supported Ayatollah Khomeni's return from exile in 1979, to replace their former puppet, the Shah. Those were the days of Brzezinski's "Arc of Instability" strategy, when being anti-Soviet more than made up for being fervently Islamic.
Having obtained the leadership with the aid of the pro-Soviet Iranians, Khomeni then turned on them, and with CIA assistance, exterminated them. Unfortunately for the US, he then turned on them too, and nationalised the oil industry. Still, you win some and you lose some.
That same Brzezinski strategy also gave rise to support for the mujihadeen in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, who subsequently became the Taliban and Al Qaeda, you know - REAL TERRORISTS !
Oil sanctions
So with the US relying only on sanctions to persuade the Iranians to not do what they already say they are not going to do, the question then becomes "How are the oil sanctions going ?"
The Europeans have agreed to apply the sanctions, although they need time to get other sources of oil in place. What they weren't counting on was Iran deciding to stop exports to Europe straight away. Although the Iranian measure has been passed by the Parliament, it hasn't been formally announced by the Government yet. Diplomatic language seems to imply that individual European Governments are to be asked if they intend to take part in the sanctions before deliveries are terminated. That way Iran cannot be accused of not honouring contracts, and there is even the possibility of splitting the Europeans.
Meanwhile
Turkey is now relieved to say it is not part of Europe, and is not bound by European sanctions. It gets half of its oil imports from Iran, and has asked the US for an exemption from the sanctions.
Iraq too relies heavily on fuel and electricity from Iran.
| www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeq...1f1
"It is not possible for Iraq to follow such sanctions," [government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh] said. "We are looking for our own interests. In a few days we are going to submit a request to the United States to exempt us." |
Japan and
South Korea have both made polite noises diplomatically, but have done nothing except say they will cut down imports from Iran, without saying how much or when.
India has been casting around trying to find a way out of the problem. They recently switched oil payments from German-based Europaisch-Iranische Handelsbank to Turkey's Turkiye Halk Bankasi AS. They need Iranian oil badly, and Iran needs grains and other foodstuffs, so a barter agreement has been mooted unofficially, as have payments in cash Rupees, Yen, gold and diamonds. They also have the BrahMos supersonic anti-ship cruise missile to bargain with, although don't expect to see that in any media.
China is the biggest buyer of Iranian oil. They snubbed Tim Geitner when he went to Beijing to ask them to join in the sanctions. As he landed, the Government announced that it thought sanctions were the wrong way to go about it, and would not take part in the sanctions. This would put the US in the position of having to apply sanctions against China, who might then withdraw its money from US Treasury Bonds in retaliation. This would crash the US Dollar, so US leverage here is not strong, hence:
Afghanistan and
Pakistan are also looking to Iran for oil, gas and electricity. The leaders of the three countries met for a summit in Islamabad 16 February.
| tribune.com.pk/story/337737/iran-afghan-presidents-arrive-of-peace-talks-pipelines-and-regional-solutions/ ... Iran has stepped up its offers to Pakistan to help with its crippling energy shortage and burgeoning oil import bill by offering a regional gas pipeline and deferred payments on purchase of petroleum products.
“Multifaceted cooperation among Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, being close neighbours, was essential to address the challenges and exploit opportunities in the region,†a statement issued after talks quoted Zardari as saying. |
Russia does not need Iranian oil, but has steadfastly refused to endorse the sanctions. It remains to be seen if they will arrange to actively help Iran out by, say, taking oil for the very latest supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, or S-300 anti-aircraft systems.
For the record,
Australia doesn't buy Iranian oil, but has continued its role as the US's loyal poodle by very publicly joining the oil sanctions. Despite this, it still continues to sell Australian wheat to Iran - shipments due in February-April quarter total 200,000 tonnes.
So it seems that the sanctions will make life difficult for Iran, but not impossible, whereas it will make life very difficult indeed for the Europeans. What's more, the US sanctions are forcing more and more world trade transactions to be completed in non-Dollar currencies, which will undermine the Dollar's position as the world's reserve currency.
Which would you rather have - a barrel of Iranian crude or a hundred US Dollars ?
Dave Kimble